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ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses an uplink power control dynamic game 
where we assume that each user battery represents the system 
state that changes with time following a discrete-time version 
of a differential game. To overcome the complexity of the 
analysis of a dynamic game approach we focus on the concept 
of Dynamic Potential Games showing that the game can be 
solved as an equivalent Multivariate Optimum Control Prob-
lem. The solution of this problem is quite interesting because 
different users split the activity in time, avoiding higher inter-
ferences and providing a long term fairness. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Dynamic Games and in particular Differential Games play a 
very important role in Game Theory (GT) in many applica-
tions as economic and management science [1]. As already 
stated, solutions are very complicated and just few simplistic 
examples are known to have closed expressions while in most 
of the cases, only approximate solutions by discretizing state 
/ actions spaces or parameterizing value / utility functions are 
affordable. On the other hand, there are just few publications 
on Electrical Engineering [2]-[4] pointing out that researchers 
start considering some dynamic effects on standard scenarios 
that require more powerful tools to characterize the solutions 
as number, uniqueness of Nash equilibria and also develop 
algorithms for finding them. In this work we consider an up-
link scenario where a set of independent users need to define 
individually the power that they are going to allocate at each 
discrete time instant in order to maximize its achievable rate. 
It should be noted that if a subset of users decide to transmit 
at time t they are going to interfere to each other, thus sig-
nificantly decreasing the achievable rate of every user. Also, 
each user has a limited battery for the transmission over time. 
This scenario describes a dynamic game where users try to 
transmit, the remaining battery represents the "state" of each 
user, and the state together with the achievable rate define the 
"utility" of each user. Finally the power that each user de-
cides to allocate at each time t is the "action". The discrete 
time domain can be assumed in this scenario without loss of 
generality since the users are not going to change their power 
in a continuous way given that most communications system 
define time intervals where the transmitted power need to be 
fixed, for example time symbol or more generally frame du-
ration. In our case, this allows us to get closer relationships 
between the problem formulation and the algorithmic imple-
mentation. Furthermore we consider an infinite (discounted) 
horizon problem because our scenario is not constrained in 
time, being the remaining energy of the battery the limitation 
that will finish the game. 
Our approach to solve the game is based on reformulat-
ing the game as an equivalent Multivariate Optimum Control 
Problem (MOCP). This procedure, known as Dynamic Po-
tential Games [5], follows the same spirit as Static Potential 
Games where the objective is to find an optimization control 
problem whose solution coincides with the Nash equilibria of 
the game. In many cases, it also provides information, un-
der certain hypothesis, about the uniqueness of the solution. 
In dynamic scenarios, although the idea is similar, the verifi-
cation of the conditions needed by the game is not a simple 
issue. The idea of Dynamic Potential Games has been very 
recently formulated in [5] although the basic principles are 
much older and originally developed by Dechert [6]-[9]. The 
rest of the manuscript is organized as follows. Sec. 2 intro-
duces the dynamic game framework and presents the game as 
a MOCP. Sec. 3 formulates our uplink power game and pro-
vides the potential function to solve the game as a MOCP. Sec. 
4, presents different approaches to solve the uplink power 
MOCP and finally Sec. 5 and 6 show the simulation results 
and the conclusions. 
2. GAME AS A CONTROL THEORETIC PROBLEM 
In a dynamic game we have a set of players i e Q = 
{ 1 . . . Q} whose utility function ixl (x t, u t) at discrete time 
t depends on the system state x t = (xlt... xit..., xqt) 
with xu G Xi and the set of actions of all players denoted 
in vector form as ut = {u\t... uit... v,Qt) where uit G W¿. 
The discrete time Dynamic Game can be represented by the 
following expression, where Vi: 
V1 (xo) = m a x 2 , fí1^1 ( X Í J u t ) 
{_uít\ —~ 
s.t : Xf-i-i = / ( x t , U t ) , gi (x t , Ut) < 0 
(1) 
Each user i intends to find the optimum sequence of actions 
{un} that maximizes its value function V1 (xo) expressed in 
terms of it own current and future (discounted) utility func-
tion 7T* (xt, Uj). Parameter ¡3 < 1 is the discount factor. Very 
importantly, there is one constraint related to the time evolu-
tion of the sequence of states { x t } typically depending on the 
previous state and current actions (Markovian model). Also, 
some extra constraints are included <?¿ (x í? ut) < 0 because 
in most of the applications, states and actions are constrained. 
Solving these problems requires finding the sequence of ac-
tions {u¿} that provide a Nash equilibria. Using similar con-
cepts as in static games: 
oo oo 
E nf ? Í 4= 4= \ ^ ^ nf ? Í 4= \ L J . 
P 7T (Xf, U _ i t , Uit) > /_, P n lXÍJ U -¿ ÍJ Uit) "* i = 0 i = 0 
where the equation must hold Vw¿t G W¿ and where u*t G W¿ 
represents the optimum action of user i at time t and u!_ i t 
is the same concept for all users except i . We wil l see next 
that in practice, this optimization procedure is very compli-
cated because each user has to solve a constrained optimum 
control problem where several coupled differential (or differ-
ence) equations are involved. Typically, for open loop solu-
tions, that is, u*t = •& (t) can be solved using the Maximum 
(or Pontryagin) Principle and for the closed loop (Feedback 
Markovian u*t = </> (x (t))) solving the Euler Equation. We 
should note that $ (t) and <f> (x (t)) are precisely the optimal 
actions’ trajectories to be determined. 
We could solve the dynamic game in (1) by defining the 
Lagrangian for each agent and optimize. Then for the i-th 
player, including the corresponding multipliers we have: 
L ( x t , ut,pt, \ t ) = ¿^t=o P 7r (.x*' u*/ + 
-\-p\ ( / ( x t , Ut) — Xt-|-i) + \\gi ( x t , Ut ) ) 
The first order condition for the optimization is given Vt: 
iT—lt1 (Xf, Ut) + pliT— ( f ÍXí, Ut) — Xf+1 ) 
+ A I TT—Q (Xt, Ut) = 0 
(2) 
(3) 
and getting the dynamical equations by taking the Lagrangian 
derivatives with respect p\ and x i + i : 
x t + i = / ( X Í J u t ) 
0~1pl = a 7rVx*+1 , Ut + 1 ) 
' f oxt+1 v ''T1 ' 
Pi 
(4) 
t dxt-\-i 9i 
including the complementary slackness condition and the 
positiveness of multiplier. It should be noted that the way to 
solve the game through the Lagrangian is by solving eqs. (3), 
(4) Vt and Vi. 
An alternative to solve the game through eqs. (3), (4), is 
to follow a different approach defining our game as an equiv-
alent Multivariate Optimum Control Problem. 
We consider the following control problem for an as yet 
unspecified function I I (x i ? ut): 
m a x á ' l l ( x t , ut) 
{ u t } ^ 
s.t. : X t+ i = / ( x t , U t ) , g ( x i ? ut) < 0 
(5) 
Similarly to what it is done in the game, we can find the opti-
mal solution from the Lagrangian: 
(Xf, Ut,pt, Aj) = ¿^t=0 P (H (.X*' U */ ~^~ 
+Pt ( / ( x t , Ut) — X t + i ) + Xtg ( x t , Uj)) (6) 
by getting the partial derivatives in the Lagrangian variables. 
It should be noted that solving the optimization control prob-
lem in (5) this way is a simpler problem than the optimization 
problem derived for the game in (3), (4) just by the fact that 
we drop the players dimensionality, however, its complexity 
may still be high enough to prevent obtaining the solution 
through the Lagrangian. 
In order for the game in (1) to be equivalent to (5), func-
tions 7T* must satisfy the following conditions Vi, j [6, 7]: 
C1. 
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/ ^ — d u i = / 
^^ OUi ^^ 
dui 
/ T;—d-Xi = / d , X i 
^^i OXi *—? { dxiduj 
If these conditions are fulfilled, the equivalent control 
problem is finally given by: 
11 (x , u ) = > — a x i + > — d u i (7) 
^^i OXi *—? OUi 
including the same set of constraints as in the original prob-
lem. Note that I I (x, u) is expressed in terms of line integrals. 
3. UPLINK POWER DYNAMIC GAME AS A 
POTENTIAL DYNAMIC GAME 
Let us now analyze the following particular game in the form 
of equation (1): 
Algorithm 1 Multi-level Waterfilling Algorithm 
1. Initialize uu for all» G Q and í e { 0 . . . N — 1}, k <— 0 
and tolerance e. 
2. For each ¿ e Q, do 
(a) Compute S\ i + y ^ -^-1/Í--i i Uot , t G {0 . . . N — 1} 
{w¿t} i = 0 
/3* log 1 + '¿í 
1 i V ^ I 7 |2 
1 + ¿^ | rt-j Mjt 
+ aíc¿í 
(8) 
S.£. .Xit-í-l Xfá Uit: xi0 -A-i 
0 < v,it < [/jmax, 0 < Xjt < X4 m a x , Vi 
max 
max 
assuming t as an integer variable. It can be noticed that the 
first term corresponds to maximizing a capacity term associ-
ated to each user, where hi is the channel coefficient of user 
i and uit is the power used by user i at time t. The second 
term (parameter a is just a scaling parameter as a degree of 
freedom to weight properly both terms) corresponds to the 
state of that user defined as the battery level measured as the 
remaining power/energy left in the battery. Clearly, at every 
time step, the more power is used, the less remaining energy 
is left. Also, standard constraints on the instantaneous power 
and energy level apply. This problem is inspired on [10] but 
adding in this case one time-varying term representing energy 
consumption. 
In Annex A we show that (8) fulfills the conditions to be 
solved as a MOCP where: 
TT / \ ^ I 12 \ ^ 
11 (Xf, Ut) = l o g 1 + y , \hm\ umt + OL ?_,xit ( 9 ) 
(b) Set /XQ = maxj {£/™ax + S\} and /x* = 0 
i. Calculate («o (&) = 02~0 and determine/x¿+1 (k) 
for all t G {0 . . . N — 2}. 
i i . Apply the waterfilling rule 
r r m a x 
u
u (k) = [/x¿ (k) — Si] * t € {0 . . . N — 1} 
i i i . I f 2~^Í=O uit íí X™ax set 7*o *~ /4 (&), otherwise 
¡il <— /x¿ (k). 
iv. Set A; <— k + 1 
v. Repeat from step (2(b)i) until /XQ — /x* < e 
(c) Set «¿J <— uit(k) for player ¿ 
3. Repeat from step (2) until stopping criteria is met. 
4.1. Waterfilling Algorithm 
We propose first to solve the MOCP for a finite horizon for 
a sufficiently large time limit, allowing this way an efficient 
solution. Forming the Lagrangian from problem (10) with 
finite time horizon yields 
Q Q 
m=l ¿=1 £• (X*' U*' P*) = / ft 1°S ^ + / l^ml Wmi + 
i = 0 m = l 
Thus the equivalent control problem to the game in (8) is 
given by: 
oo / / Q \ Q \ 
max \ ^ /? log 1 + \^ I ^m | umt + a N , xu 
i = 0 m = l ¿=1 
m a x 
i ; s.i. :x j i + i = Xjt — «¿i, XJO = X^ 
o < W¿Í < u™ax, o < xit < x™axyi 
Q Q 
+ a N Xjt + > pj (ÍC¿Í+I — ÍC¿Í + uu) 
¿ = i ¿=1 
s.i. 0 < «¿J < U™ax, pl>0, 0 < Xjt < X4 m a x , V¿, í 
and solving for the control variables with the KKT condition 





i + jy^i I ^ I 'if 
i^ ¿r 
Therefore, we have shown that if we are able to solve the 
MOCP given by (10), we can guarantee that its solution is a 
Nash equilibria of the original problem given by equation (8). 
4. SOLVING THE GAME 
Once it has been shown that we can solve the game as the 
control problem in (10), we will show next two approaches 
to solve the control problem avoiding the Lagrange approach 
explained in Sec. 2. 
(11) 
where [z]^ := min {max {z, a} , 6}, t G { 0 . . . W — 1} and 
where p¿ represents the inverse of a water level to be deter-
mined. To calculate these dual variables, the KKT condi-
tion dC/dxit+i = —¡3t+1 ( a + p j + 1 ) + ¡ilp\ = 0 of the 
state variables provide the relation p!,-, = 4p! — a, t G 
{0 . . . N — 2} which form a recursive set of equations, for a 
given first value p}¡. The interpretation behind this result is 
graphically understood with water levels which are different 
from each other at all instants, but that are related with the 




position of every step is given by p\+i. This multi-level wa-
terfilling is novel in its result, and can be formalized in Algo-
rithm 1, where we have introduced water level variables ¡JL\ = 
i for numerical reasons, that transform plt+1 into / 4 + 1 = 
¡3¡JL\/\ — a.¡i¡i\. We have solved the MOCP by applying a 
Gauss-Seidel sequence of updates, where each control vari-
able determines the interference parameters on step (2a) with 
the last known control variables from previously optimized 
players. In addition to this, we have used a bisection algo-
rithm to determine the unknown water levels ¡JÍQ and recur-
sively solved for t G {0 . . . N — 2}. 
4.2. Iterative solutions based on Dynamic Programming 
The control problem in (10) can be rewritten in a more com-
pact way following Dynamic Programming Principles as: 
V (xo) = maxll (xo, uo) + ¡ÍV ( / (xo, uo)) 
uo 
s.t. : g (x t, u t) < 0 
(12) 
where I I (x i ? ut) follows the definition in (9) and g (x i ? ut) 
represent the boundary restrictions in (10). We can solve the 
previous problem iteratively by following a value function it-
erative approach assuming that we are able to solve the right 
hand side of equation (12) obtaining Ug = h (xo) and substi-
tuting back in (12) we get: 
V (xo) = II (xo, h (xo)) + ¡iV ( / (xo, h (xo))) (13) 
Given that V (•) is unknown in a first stage, we propose to 
iterate as shown in Algorithm 2. In practice, the loop ends 
when a certain condition on the stability of the solution is 
fulfilled. Policy iteration procedures can also be applied in a 
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Algorithm 2 Value function iterative algorithm 
1. Initialize VQ (X) = 0 
2. for k = 0 to oo, do 
(a) find hk (x) = argmaxu II (x, u) + ¡3Vk (g (x, u)) 
(b) Vfc+i (x) = II (x, hk (x)) + ¡3Vk (g (x, /ifc(x))) 
5. RESULTS 
In our simulation scenario we have considered Q = 4 players, 
a maximum transmit power level of U™ax = 5, total battery 
power X™ax = 33, forgetting value ¡3 = 0.95 and weight-
ing value a = 0.001. We have simulated both alternatives 
given in previous section and they provide similar results, for 
that reason we just show here results for the waterfilling al-
gorithm with time horizon N = 100. Channels are randomly 
obtained with zero mean gaussian complex distribution. We 
can observe in Figure 1 that players transmit in strict order 
where users that have better channels transmit first, and then 
the rest. It seems, that this division in time avoids interfer-
ence to other users, and allows to achieve the highest value in 
the potential function, and equivalently, in the game. This is 
the case, because the utility considers that running out of bat-
tery is detrimental towards the device’s performance and so 
users decide to save battery until the channel becomes empty, 
coordinating to avoid collisions in time. 
Finally in Figure2 we have plotted the total sum of instant 
capacities of each player as solved by Algorithm 1 (in blue) 
vs. the proposed algorithm in [10] that does not consider the 
state of the battery in its formulation (in orange): 
'¿í argmax log 1 + 
0 ≤ u i t ≤ U m a x i + jy^i N 2 it 
—"f\hi\ uu 
with 7 = 0.1. With this comparison we simply state, that hav­
ing into consideration the battery life of the devices allows to 










This work formulates an uplink power control scenario as a 
dynamic game, given that the battery of each user decreases 
as they assign power in different time slots. To further solve 
the dynamic game, first the game is reformulated as a con-
trol problem, and latter waterfilling and iterative approaches 
are proposed to solve the control problem. The results show 
an interesting behavior where the users transmit in strict or-
der following a channel quality criteria, that is the solution 
follows a scheduling philosophy. 
A. ANNEX 
We wil l prove next that TT'1 (x i? ut) in (8) fullfils C1-C3 and 
then solve the line integral in (7) to get the potencial function 
d27T¿ d2^ 
^ Q I 7 I 2 ^ / 
The third equality results from the fact that i=\ I "¿I S is 
the derivative of the sum term in the denominator of the inte-
gral. For the state term: 
n ( x t , u t ) . C1 is trivial
 a a a a 
validate C2.a we proceed as follows: 
= 0 
dujdiij 
1 |2 I |2 
Ihi \hj 
v ^ 17 |2 
1 + /Lm \h™\ "">* 
yi,j. To 
(14) 
and due to the symmetric structure in (14), it is straight-
forward to show that C2.a is satisfied. Identically for C2.b 
TT-^Í— = TT-T,— = 0. And finally, for C3.a and C3.b we 
OXiOXj OXjOXi 
have: 
Q d-K1 Q 927T* 
T;— / T;—dui = / 7 ; 7 : d u i = 0 
ox-j *-^ dui ¿-^ OUiOXj J
 i=l i=l J 
O / ^-^ oír I s—^, O IT 
— > — a x i = / T\7, dxi = 0 
duj *-^ oxi ¿-^ oxiou-i 
(15) 
We solve now (7) in order to obtain the corresponding equiv-
alent optimal control problem. Let us analyze each term in-
dividually by defining £ : [0,1] —> (U\ x . . . x UQ) like a 
piecewise continuously differentiable path in the utility do-
main with £i (0) = 0 and £¿ (1) = w¿ and r¡ : [0,1] —>• 
(X\ x . . . x XQ) like a piecewise continuously differentiable 
path in the state domain with rji (0) = 0 and rji (1) = x¿. We 
must recall that in this case, initial sate conditions would not 
be null because batteries start from a full level, but we have 
simplified the expression removing a constant term that is also 
considered when defining the constraints: 
l Q 
V~^ &~n v ^ 
/ ^—dui = y 
d-K1 (x, £) d£i(\) 
¿=1 
0 dui dX 
dX = 
£?=iN d^i (A) dX = o 
o 1 + J2m\hm\ Cm (A) dX 
/ \ ^ |7 | 2 ^ - | \ \ 1 / 1 , \ ^ 1 12 * (C\\ \ 
= log 1 + y , I"™. I Sm (J-J — i°g J- + /_, \hm\ U (U) 
m m 
f V~^ ^IT f V~^ 
/ T . d x i = y 
^^ OXi
 0 ¿-^ 






dX = a y r/i (1) — a y rji (0) 
O •_-, dX z-^¡ ¿-^ 
Finally with the initial conditions defined before for £¿ (•) and 
rji (•) and introducing the time reference we get: 
\ Q 
1 i \ ^ 17 i2 \ . \ ^ j- + y,I"™I Umt ~^~ay_j 
m i=\ 
T T / \ ^ 17 12 \ ^ 
11 (Xf, ut) = log 1 + y , I"™. I Umt + a ?,xit 
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